How to build a faster private information retrieval protocol? by Wei Zhang et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
How to build a faster private information retrieval protocol?
Wei Zhang • Shuguang Liu •
Weidong Zhong • Xiaoyuan Yang
Received: 11 November 2013 / Accepted: 20 April 2014 / Published online: 5 June 2014
 The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract A CPA secure multi-bit somewhat homomor-
phic encryption scheme based on Learning With Errors
over Rings assumption is presented. We use canonical
embedding to transform ring elements into vectors over Zq,
and thus decrease encryption and decryption cost. Com-
paring with GHV scheme appeared in 2010, to encrypt
n bits, this scheme can reduce encryption cost from O(n3/2)
into O(nlog n). Finally, an efficient private information
retrieval protocol that employs this scheme is presented.
Keywords Homomorphic encryption 
RLWE assumption  Canonical embedding 
Private information retrieval
Abbreviations
PIR Private information retrieval
FHE Fully homomorphic encryption
SWHE Somewhat homomorphic encryption
LWE Learning with errors
RLWE Learning with errors over rings
1 Introduction
Homomorphic encryption is a powerful cryptographic
primitive that allow for a variety of applications. It is a
form of encryption which allows specific types of com-
putations to be carried out on ciphertext and obtain an
encrypted result which decrypted matches the result of
operations performed on the plaintext. There are many
interesting applications including private information
retrieval (PIR), electronic voting, database encryption,
delegated computation and secure multiparty computation
(Chen et al. 2012a, b).
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) permits arbi-
trarily computation on encrypted data (Gentry 2009).
During the past 4 years, numerous constructions of FHE
involving novel mathematical techniques and a number of
applications have appeared (Dijk et al. 2010; Stehle and
Steinfeld 2010; Smart and Vercauteren 2010; Brakerski
and Vaikuntanathan 2011a; Bogdanov and Lee 2011;
Brakerski et al. 2012). However, it seems that most of the
available FHE schemes still have a long way to go before
they can be used in practice. Comparing with the theoret-
ical perfect but unpractical FHE, somewhat homomorphic
encryption (SWHE), which only permits a specific set of
operations, seems more efficient, and most of the actual
applications only involve SWHE schemes by now.
The main target of this work is to construct an efficient
multi-bit somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme.
Starting from Regev’s Learning With Errors over Rings
(RLWE)-based scheme (Regev 2009) and using canonical
embedding to improve efficiency, we present a new con-
struction of SWHE scheme that supports a larger plaintext
space and faster encryption. Moreover, we provide a Pri-
vate Block Retrieval (PBR) protocol using this scheme.
2 Related works
Boneh et al. (2005) described a cryptosystem (denoted by
BGN) that permits arbitrary numbers of additions and one
multiplication, without growing the ciphertext size. Later
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in EUROCRYPT 2010, Gentry et al. (2010) constructed a
variant of BGN, called GHV, it is based on Learning With
Errors (LWE) assumption, supports a larger message space
and has a better message-to-ciphertext expansion ratio than
BGN. In GHV, to encrypt m2 bits, the encryption process
has a computation cost of ~Oðm3Þ.
Aiming at constructing time-efficient schemes that
supports larger message spaces, we present a multi-bit
SWHE scheme that is basing on RLWE assumption.
Comparing with GHV, our scheme are more time-efficient,
to encrypt n bits, the total encryption cost is ~O n log nð Þ.
Such improvement attributes to the combination of the
more compact RLWE assumption and canonical embed-
ding. We show how to use this scheme to build an efficient
PIR (private information retrieval) protocol.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Homomorphic encryption schemes
Definition 1 A Homomorphic Encryption scheme (HE)
can be described as a 4-tuple of algorithms HE = (Key-
Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval). The algorithms are probabilistic
polynomial-time and satisfy the following properties:
• KeyGen(1k): given security parameter k, output (pk, sk,
evk), where pk and sk are public key and private key
respectively, and evk is the public homomorphic
evaluation key.
• Enc(pk, m): given the encryption key pk and a message
m, the encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext c,
denoted by c = Enc(pk, m).
• Dec(sk, c): given a ciphertext c and decryption key sk,
output a plaintext m.
• Eval(evk, f, c1, c2…, cl): Given the homomorphic
evaluation key evk, a function f and l ciphertexts c1,
c2…, cl, output a ciphertext cf, satisfying cf = Enc(pk,
f(Dec(sk, c1), Dec(sk, c2),……, Dec(sk, cl)))
This definition is a generic description of homomorphic
encryption schemes, and the material of function f is
omitted. Generally f can be expressed as a Boolean circuit
on field GF(2n), and only contains ADD and OR operations.
3.2 RLWE assumption
The LWE problem has gained a universal notice since it
had been first introduceed by Regev in (2009). In Eurocrypt
2010, Lyubashevsky et al. (2010) analyzed the efficiency
of LWE-based cryptosystems. For a standard LWE
assumption, obtaining one pseudorandom scalar bi [ Zq
requires an n-dim inner production computation. They
propose a more compact version of LWE called RLWE,
that is, LWE assumptions on a given ring, where con-
ducting an n-dim inner production can get another n-dim
vector. This makes an efficiency improvement by n times.
Definition 2 (RLWE assumption) Let f(x) be an n-degree
polynomial with integer coefficients, q is a prime, and ring
Rq is defined as Rq ¼ Zq½x= f ðxÞh i. Let v be error distri-
bution on Rq, s $ Rq, ai $ Rq, k = poly(n). For any given
k pairs (ai, bi = ais ? ei) i=1
k , where ei is the error vector,
then bi is computationally indistinguishable from any uni-
formly chosen element in Rq.
Lyubashevsky et al. (2010) have proved that, the
Shortest Independent Vector Problem (SIVP) or Shortest
Vector Problem (SVP) in the worst case on ideal lattice can
be reduced to RLWE. Their main result can be captured as
the following: with error distribution be Dn and n = a(nl/
log (nl))1/4, given l samples, the RLWE problem is at least
as hard as SIVP problem in a lattice.
To make the description more clear, we only use RLWE
assumption on a special polynomial R ¼ Zq½x= xn þ 1h i
where n is a power of 2 and q = 1 mod 2n.
3.3 Canonical embedding in polynomial rings
Canonical embedding was first proposed by Minkowski
(Lyubashevsky et al. 2010). Let n = 2 k, q = 1 mod 2n is a
prime, and x = exp (pi/n), then canonical embedding is
defined as a mapping r from Rq ¼ Zq½x= f ðxÞh iinto vector
space on complex numbers Cn, that is aðxÞ7! ðaðx1Þ;
aðx3Þ; . . .; aðx2n1ÞÞ 2 Cn. Where a(x) 2 Rq and f(x) =
xn ? 1.
Using canonical embedding, we can map a polynomial
in Rq ¼ Zq½x= f ðxÞh iinto a Ring vector. When a polyno-
mial is mapped into a vector in Cn, both addition and
multiplication can be conducted coordinate-wise, thus
making computation more convenient. Especially when
q is a prime and q = 1 mod 2n, x2i-1, i = 1, …, n-1 are
just the n roots of xn ? 1 in Zq, so a polynomial
aðxÞ 2 Zq½x= xn þ 1h ican be mapped into an elements in
Z
n
qor a n-dim vector on Zq.
For a given rðaðxÞÞ ¼ ðaðx1Þ; aðx3Þ; . . . ; aðx2n1ÞÞ
2 Znq, we can get its preimage a(x) by solving a linear
equation set of n variables.
4 Multi-bit homomorphic encryption schemes based
on RLWE assumption
4.1 The basic scheme
The first single-bit public key encryption scheme basing on
LWE assumption was proposed by Regev in (2009), and
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from this scheme, people have promoted some other con-
structions and applications. The multi-bit version of Re-
gev’s scheme can be implemented on RLWE assumption
as the following (Ru¨ckert and Schneider 2010).
Scheme 1 (RLWE based version of Regev’s multi-bit
encryption scheme) Parameters: let q be a prime, q : 1
mod 2n, R ¼ Zq½x= xn þ 1h i, v is discrete Gauss distribu-
tion. A sample that conforms to v is noted by e(x) 2 R with
r C 1. Define a set Dr as Dr ¼ Z \  r2
 
; . . .; r
2
   	
=
hxn þ 1i
For a positive integer k, define two operations on Rk:
1. Multiplication of two polynomial vectors  : Rk 9
Rk ? R: For any x^; y^ 2 Rk, x^ y^ ¼Pki¼1 xiyi
2. Multiplication of one polynomial vector and one
polynomial: for any x^ 2 Rk, y 2 R, x^y ¼ ðx1y; . . .;
xkyÞ 2 Rk
• Private key: randomly choose s 
$
R, the length of
s is nlog2q bits.
• Public key: randomly choose a k-dim vector
a^ $ Rk, choose error vector e^ vkR;a, here v
R,a
k obeys discrete Gaussian distribution on Rk, with
expectation 0 and standard deviation
a 1=t ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃnkp r=2d eþ 1Þ. Computing a vector
b^ ¼ a^sþ e^ 2 Rk, and the public key is ða^; b^Þ. To
decrease key length, we could let all of the users
share the same a^. So the length of public key is kn
log2q bits.
• Encryption: given a plaintext m 2 D1 ¼ Z2½x=
xn þ 1h i, randomly choose r^ $ Dkr , compute a pair
(c0, c1) as the ciphertext, here c0 ¼ a^ r^ 2 Rand
c1 ¼ b^ r^ þ mðq 1Þ=2 2 R.
• Decryption: compute c1  c0s ¼ mðq 1Þ=2þ e^
r^  mðq 1Þ=2
Correctness of scheme 1 is shown in Ru¨ckert and
Schneider (2010), and when a 1=30 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃnkp r=2d e, the
scheme can decrypt correctly.
4.2 A new scheme using canonical mapping
Basing on scheme 1, we use canonical mapping to con-
struct a new scheme.
Scheme 2
• Parameters: Let q be a prime and q  1 mod 2n, let x
be a root of xn ? 1 in Zq, and (q-1)/2 cannot be divided
by x. The error distribution v R,a
k is discrete Gaussian
distribution on Rk, with expectation 0 and standard
deviation a 1=t ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃnkp r=2d e þ 1 	. Definition of Dr and
polynomial vector operations are the same with
scheme 1.
• Private key: s $ R, s.t. s(0) is not a divisor of (q-1)/2.
The length of private key is nlog2q bits.
• Public key: Randomly choose a k-dim polynomial
vector a^ $ Rk. Choose error vector e^ vkR;aand set
b^ ¼ a^sþ e^ 2 Rk. To reduce key length, we can let all of
the users share the same a^, and the public key is
ða^; b^Þwhich has a length of kn log2q bits.
• Encryption: Encryption has three steps.
1. For any given n-bits plaintext m [ D1, let m = (m0, m1,
…, mn-1) and randomly choose r^ $ Dkr
2. Compute c0 ¼ b^ r^, c1 ¼ a^ r^. Noticing that c0, c1
are two polynomials in R, we can use canonical
mapping to change them into vectors in Znq, namely
c0 7!ðc0ðxÞ; c0ðx3Þ; . . .; c0ðx2n1ÞÞ ¼ C0
c1 7!ðc1ðxÞ; c1ðx3Þ; . . .; c1ðx2n1ÞÞ ¼ C1
3. Compute C2 ¼ C0 þ q12 ðm0; . . .mn1Þ, and output the
ciphertext (C1, C2).
• Decryption: Also includes three steps.
1. Use the inverse of canonical mapping to change C1
into a polynomial c1ðxÞ ¼ a^ r^;
2. Compute c1ðxÞ  s ¼ a^ r^  s ¼ b^ r^  e^ r^  c0ðxÞ,
and transform c1(x)s into a vector S;
3. Compute ðC2  SÞ mod x  q12 m
Theorem 1 When the parameters satisfy the aforemen-
tioned requirement, Scheme 2 can decrypt correctly.
Proof Consider the decryption process,
C2  S ¼ C0 þ q 1
2
m r c1 xð Þsð Þ
¼ b^ r^ 	 xð Þ; . . .; b^ r^ 	 x2n1 	 	
 a^ r^sð Þ xð Þ; . . .; a^ r^sð Þ x2n1 	 	þ q 1
2
m
We focus on the first item, and case of the other items is
analogous. The first item of the above formula is
a^ r^sð Þ xð Þ þ e^ r^ð Þ xð Þ  a^ r^sð Þ xð Þ þ q 1
2
m0
¼ e^ r^ð Þ xð Þ þ q 1
2
m0
where e^ r^ð Þ xð Þis a polynomial about x in R, and after a
module operation, only the constant term remains. Let
e^ ¼ e1; . . .; ekð Þ, r^ ¼ r1; . . .; rkð Þ, then e^ r^ ¼
Pk
i¼1 eiri.
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Considering e^ vkR;a, on account of Chebyshev’s law, for
n independent samples that abiding the same Gaussian
distribution Xi / N(l, r








k eiri obeys a









¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃnkp ra=2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃnkp r=2d ea 1=t.
According to the truncated inequality of Normal distribu-
tion,we have Pr
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t C 30, this value can be ignored, so Pr ([
P
i=1
k ei(0)] B q/
4) & 1. Considering that x is not a divisor of (q-1)/2, the





m0. Thus completes the proof.
Theorem 2 For any e[ 0 and m C (1 ? e)(1 ? n) -
log q, if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm that can attack the CPA security of scheme 2
with advantage e, then there exist a poly-time distinguisher
V that for any possible private key s, can distinguish dis-
tribution a^; a^sþ e^ð Þja^ $ Rk; e^ DR;n; s $ R
n o
and uni-
form distribution U on Rk 9 Rk, here n = a  (nk/
log (nk))1/4.
Proof We only discuss the first bit m0 of a plaintext.
Suppose there exists a CPA attacker A that can distinguish
the ciphertext of m0 = 0 and m0 = 1 with advantage e. We
construct a distinguisher V which can distinguish the fol-
lowing two distributions with advantage at least e/2:
a^; a^sþ e^ð Þja^ $ Rk;ai 0ð Þ ¼ 1; i ¼ 1; . . .; k; e^ DR;n; s $ R;
n
s 0ð Þ ¼ 1gand Uniform distribution U on Rk 9 Rk. The
distinguisher V is constructed as the following:Input of V
are two polynomial vectors a^; b^
 	
in Rk 9 Rk, satisfying
that each constant term of a^is 1. Now V can invoke A to
judge that whether a^; b^
 	
obeys uniform distribution or is a
RLWE vector. Using a^; b^
 	
as private key, V invokes A, the
latter generate two message bits m0, m1, and send them to
V. V randomly choose i 2 {0, 1}, encrypt mi and send the
ciphertext back to A. If A can guess the correct i and return
it to V, then V outputs 1, else, outputs 0.Let the challenging
ciphertext be (C1, C2), if r is canonical mapping,
then the first bit of C1 and C2 are a^ r^ð Þ xð Þand
b^ r^ 	 xð Þ þ q1
2
m0respectively. If b^is chosen randomly
and uniformly in Rk, and is independent of a^, then the first
bit of the challenging ciphertext is also randomly and
uniformly. In this case, the probability of ‘‘V outputs 1’’ is
at most 1/2. On the other side, if b^ ¼ a^sþ e^and the
parameters are chosen according to the requirement, then
by assumption, the probability of A correctly guessing i is
(1 ? e)/2, so V can output 1 with the same probability.
Thus completes the proof, namely, V can distinguish two
distributions with advantage e/2.
4.3 Homomorphic evaluations






C1 ¼ ðc1ðxÞ; c1ðx3Þ; . . .; c1ðx2n1ÞÞ




 	þ q 1
2







C01 ¼ ðc01ðxÞ; c01ðx3Þ; . . .; c01ðx2n1ÞÞ
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When computing the sum of two ciphertexts, we could
simply add them coordinate-wise, and get Cadd1;Cadd2ð Þ ¼
C1 þ C01;C2 þ C02
 	
Due to the use of canonical mapping, multiplication of
two vectors could also done coordinate-wisely. Let ‘‘*’’
denote the coordinate-wise multiplication of vectors, then
Cmult1;Cmult2ð Þ ¼ C1 	 C01;C2 	 C02
 	
We focus on the decryption of the first item. Case of the
other items is analogous.
The first item of C2 * C 2
0











During the decryption process, we need to change C1 -
* C 1
0
into a polynomial, multiply it with s2 and then
transform the result into a vector Smult. The first item of
Smult is
s2 xð Þc1 xð Þc01 xð Þ ¼ a^ r^ xð Þs xð Þ  a^ r^0 xð Þs xð Þ
ð4 1Þ
Noticing that
c0 xð Þc00 xð Þ ¼ a^ r^ð Þ xð Þs xð Þ þ e^ r^ð Þ xð Þ½ 

 a^ r^0ð Þ xð Þs xð Þ þ e^ r^0ð Þ xð Þ½  ð4 2Þ
Subtract (4-2) by (4-1), we can get
e^ r^ð Þ xð Þ e^ r^0ð Þ xð Þ þ a^ r^ð Þ xð Þs xð Þ e^ r^0ð Þ xð Þ
þ a^ r^0ð Þ xð Þs xð Þ e^ r^ð Þ xð Þ ¼ D
The last decryption step in scheme 2 is to compute C2-S,
and after homomorphic multiplication, it needs to compute
C2 * C 2
0
-Smult. Then the first item is






0 xð Þ þ
q 1
2






where c0 xð Þ ¼ a^ r^ð Þ xð Þs xð Þ þ e^ r^ð Þ xð Þ, c00 xð Þ ¼
a^ r^0ð Þ xð Þs xð Þ þ e^ r^0ð Þ xð Þ. Noticing that besides the
first item, all of the other items are multiples of x, and
recalling that x is not a divisor of (q-1)2/4, so we can
divide the first item by x, and get the residue:
e^ r^ð Þ 0ð Þ e^ r^0ð Þ 0ð Þ þ a^ r^ð Þ 0ð Þs 0ð Þ e^ r^0ð Þ 0ð Þ
þ a^ r^0ð Þ 0ð Þs 0ð Þ e^ r^ð Þ 0ð Þ þ q 1
2
m0 a^ r^ð Þ 0ð Þs 0ð Þ½
þ e^ r^ð Þ 0ð Þ þ q 1
2
m00 a^ r^0ð Þ 0ð Þs 0ð Þ þ e^ r^0ð Þ 0ð Þ½ 






Also noticing that s(0) is not a divisor of (q-1)/2, dividing
the above formula by s(0) and get the residue, the first item
becomes
e^ r^ð Þ 0ð Þ e^ r^0ð Þ 0ð Þ þ q 1
2
m0 e^ r^ð Þ 0ð Þ
þ q 1
2







where e^ r^ð Þ 0ð Þand e^ r^0ð Þ 0ð Þare constant items of
e^ r^and e^ r^0respectively.
According to the proof of theorem 4.1, C2 * C 2
0
can be
correctly decrypted and thus obtain the multiplication of
two plaintexts.
4.4 Efficiency
The advantage of scheme 2 lies in a shorter key length and
smaller computation cost, we give a detailed analysis below.
Key length: The length of public key is knlog2q bits. The
private key is a polynomial in R with constant item 1, and
the length of private key is nlog2q bits.
Computation cost:
1. During encryption, the computing cost of polynomial
convolution can be reduced through a Fast Fourier
Transformation. To encrypt n bits, the total computa-
tion cost is ~O n log nð Þ.
2. During decryption, it needs to compute the inverse of
canonical mapping, then compute a polynomial mul-
tiplication and one canonical mapping, finally a vector
subtraction. The total computation cost is ~O n log nð Þ.
3. Homomorphic addition: The addition of two cipher-
texts is simply vector addition, the computation cost is
~O nð Þ. After an addition, the length of ciphertext is not
increased, and accordingly the computation cost of
decryption remains the same.
4. Homomorphic multiplication: Multiplication of two
ciphertexts only needs to directly compute vector
multiplication on Znqcoordinate-wise, the computing
cost is ~O n log nð Þ. After multiplication, the length of
ciphertext increase to 4nlog2q bits, namely doubled. In
decryption phase, for each ciphertext element, it needs
to solve a linear equation set, then compute one
polynomial multiplication and one subtraction, the
total computation cost of decryption is ~O n2ð Þ.
To sum up, we confirm that comparing with scheme 1,
scheme 2 has an obvious advantage in efficiency. The key
length and computation cost is controlled in a rational
bound. We believe that scheme 2 is a practical somewhat
homomorphic encryption scheme.
5 Private information retrieval protocol basing
on scheme 2
5.1 A PBR protocol
The most representative application of homomorphic
encryption is to construct private information retrieval (PIR)
protocols (Cachin et al. 1999). Using homomorphic encryp-
tion, communication complexity of PIR protocol can be
reduced to poly(log n) bits, this is a great improvement. Ku-
shilevitz and Ostrovsky (1997) first introduced homomorphic
encryption into PIR protocols, their PIR protocol has sub-
linear time-complexity and exponential communication cost.
In 2009, Gentry discussed (2009) how to implement PIR
protocol using homomorphic encryption. In 2011, Brakerski
and Vaikuntanathan (2011b) presented a generic framework
through combining a FHE with a symmetric key encryption
scheme. Most of the available PIR protocols refer to single bit
retrieval, while in fact, a record in a database is often longer
than one bit, thus arise a natural expansion of PIR, namely
PBR (Private Block Retrieval) protocols.
We introduce a PBR protocol basing on scheme2.
Considering a database that each record of which is more
than one bit, we use multi-bit encryption scheme to encrypt
index information, thus can reduce the number of cipher-
text, and also reduce communication cost.
Suppose there are n records in a database, each has a length
of d bits. The initial position of each record is represented by
indexes, which has a length of log n bits. Let
SYM = (SYM.KeyGen, SYM.Enc, SYM.Dec) be a secure
symmetric key encryption scheme, with plaintext space
{0,1}logn, without lost of generality, assuming that the
ciphertext space also be {0,1}logn. Let SWHE ¼ SWHE:ð
KeyGen; SWHE:Enc; SWHE:Dec; SWHE:EvalÞbe a some-
what homomorphic encryption scheme on plaintext space
{0,1}k, where k = poly(log n).
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Our PBR protocol is comprised of four algorithms:
PBR ¼ ðSetup;Query;Response;DecodeÞ
The algorithms are defined as the following:
• Setup(1k): on inputting the security parameter k,
generate the symmetric key symsk / SYM.Keygen(1k)
and keys of the SWHE scheme (hpk, hevk, hsk) /
SWHE.Keygen(1k), then encrypt symsk with the public
key, namely Csymsk / SWHE.Enchpk(symsk).
The setup stage output the public parameters Pa-
rams: = (hpk,hevk,Csymsk), and private parameters Set-
upstate: = (hsk, symsk).
• Query(1k, setupstate, i): Suppose the ith record is to be
required, i[{1,…,n}, the user encrypts i by symsk, and
generate the query string query, namely query /
SYM.Encsymsk(i).
• Response(1k,DB,params,query): Upon receiving the
query string query, database compute the query func-
tion h(Csymsk), and let resp / SWHE.Evalhevk(h(Csym-
sk)), thus can get the a ciphertext of DB[i]. Where the
query function h(x) is defined as
h xð Þ ¼def DB SYM:Dec x; queryð Þ½ 
• Decode(1k,setupstate, qstate, resp): the receiver decrypt
resp, and obtain b / SWHE.Dechsk(resp)
5.2 Analysis
The above protocol can be implemented using a LWE-
based symmetric encryption scheme combining with our
multi-bit SWHE scheme. In this implementation, the index
has a length of log n bits (here n present the number of
records in a database), so the size of query information
query is log n bits. According to scheme 2, the response
information to a query has 2d logq bits. So in the above
PBR protocol, to retrieve d bits, the protocol has a com-
munication complexity of 2dlogq ? logn, communication
cost of each bit is 2 log q ? ( log n)/d, which is a poly-
nomial of the length of q and n. Such a communication
complexity is fairly reasonable.
On the other hand, let’s consider the computational cost
of this protocol. Also according to the SWHE scheme,
suppose the decryption algorithm has one multiplication,
then to generate response information, the server has a
computation cost of ~O n log nð Þ, while in user end, com-
putation cost of decryption is ~O n2ð Þ.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we provide a somewhat homomorphic multi-
bit encryption scheme that is basing on RLWE assumption.
We use canonical mapping in the process of encryption and
homomorphic evaluations. Due to this technique and the
comparatively compact RLWE assumption, the new
scheme is time-efficient and the number of ciphertext
elements will not increase after homomorphic evaluations.
Using this scheme, an efficient PIR protocol can be
constructed.
Homomorphic encryption scheme is a new hot area in
cryptography. There has been abundant works in recent
years focusing on scheme construction and application, and
new methods and new ideas have appeared continuously.
However there still leaves a lot of problems to solve, both
in theoretical and practical.
Aiming on performance improvement, we use a new
technique to construct scheme, and our scheme is practical
due to its computation cost and key length, while because
homomorphic multiplication can cause an increase in
ciphertext length, the scheme is somewhat but not fully
homomorphic. Further studies on controlling ciphertext
length and ultimately constructing fully homomorphic
encryption schemes will be our target in the future.
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